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ARTICLE

The Limits of Legality: Assessing Recent
International Interventions in Civil Conflicts
in the Middle-East
FEISAL AMIN RASOUL AL-ISTRABADI†
INTRODUCTION
Legal commentators and practitioners expend great effort
assessing international military interventions in legal terms. It is to
be expected, of course, that they should do so, and such
commentaries are obviously invaluable. Often such analyses seem
forced, however, and do not adequately acknowledge Realpolitik
considerations that enter into states’ decisions respecting where and
when to intervene militarily when civil conflicts arise. This paper
argues that in the current international system—i.e., the United
Nations system—such Realpolitik considerations often trump legal
ones, and constitute the true limit on state action.
Legal
considerations, then, frequently take on a secondary importance.
Calls for international intervention in civil conflicts in the
Middle East, whether with or without United Nations Security
Council (UNSC, the Council) authorization, have occurred in at least
three countries since 2006: Iraq, Libya, and Syria.1 In the case of
Libya and Syria, many such calls were grounded in appeals to the
doctrine of humanitarian intervention or the responsibility to protect
† Founding Director, Center for the Study of the Middle East and Professor of
the Practice of International Law and Diplomacy in the Maurer School of Law and
the School of Global and International Studies, Indiana University—Bloomington;
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary (2004-2012) and Deputy Permanent
Representative of Iraq to the United Nations, New York (2004-2010). The author
is grateful to Mr. Timothy McCormick, Editor-in-chief, and the staff and editors of
the Maryland Journal of International Law, for their many courtesies that are too
numerous to list.
1. The wars in Iraq and Libya are analyzed, respectively, in sections III and IA,
infra. Syria is assessed in sections IB and II, infra.

119

120

MARYLAND JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [VOL. 29:119

civilians against abuses committed by their respective governments.2
In Iraq, though the Council did not authorize renewed hostilities in
2003, it did authorize the presence of the Multinational Force in Iraq
(MNF-I) pursuant to its Chapter VII powers after the commencement
of hostilities.3 The presence of US forces in Iraq in the “surge”
phase, therefore, can be thought of conceptually as a UNSCauthorized international intervention at a time when Iraq was patently
in thrall to a brutal and barbaric civil war.
This article considers the doctrine of humanitarian intervention4
in conflicts that involve the competing interests of the five permanent
members of the Security Council. These competing political interests
appear to be a far better analytical tool for assessing whether
intervention is likely to occur than legal considerations. The focus of
this argument is the different international reactions to the civil wars
in Libya and Syria. The discussion of the different reactions to these
two internal conflicts is informed by the fact that in Syria—where the
international community qua se failed to intervene—much larger
numbers of civilian casualties occurred than Libya, where the
international community did intervene.5 Since Realpolitik
considerations often trump legal considerations at international fora
such as the UNSC, this paper argues that it remains easier—and more
predictive—to analyze international interventions in civil conflicts in
political, rather than legal, terms.

2. The UNSC authorized Member States and regional organizations, in
cooperation with the Secretary-General, to use “all necessary measures . . . to
protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack.” S.C. Res.
1973, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1973 (Mar. 17, 2011). As to Syria, more than one US
senator called for unilateral military intervention to relieve the suffering of civilians
and to support rebel forces. See e.g., Mark Landler, Romney Calls for Action on
Syria, but His Party Is Divided, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 2012, at A6.
3. See S.C. Res. 1511, ¶¶ 13–14, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1511 (Oct. 16, 2003). See
also M. Cherif Bassiouni, Legal Status of US Forces in Iraq from 2003-2008, 11
CHI. J. INT’L L. 1, 3-8 (2010).
4. See generally e.g., GARETH EVANS, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT:
ENDING MASS ATROCITY CRIMES ONCE AND FOR ALL (2008) (describing a key
doctrine of humanitarian intervention).
5. See infra texts accompanying notes 69–71; Amos N. Guiora, Intervention in
Libya, Yes; Intervention in Syria, No: Deciphering the Obama Administration, 44
CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 251, 272–73 (2011).

2014]

ASSESSING RECENT INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTIONS

121

Given the obvious fact that world powers are not eleemosynary
institutions, it should be expected that states will react in terms of
their own interests rather than an overarching theory of law.6 Again,
such considerations do not result from legal assessments, but the
political realities that govern the conduct of interveners. Thus, for
instance, in the United States, Barack Obama campaigned in a sense
as the anti-George W. Bush candidate, promising to reverse a number
of Bush-era policies in foreign relations. The truth, however, is that,
once elected, and once the responsibility of governing became his,
President Obama adopted many of the Bush Administration’s
policies, albeit perhaps sub silentio.7 This confluence of policy
occurred with respect to the much-lambasted doctrine of preventive
war proposed by the Bush Administration.8 Though the doctrine was
generally rejected by even the closest allies of the United States with
respect to Iraq, the Obama Administration embraced the approach in
respect to Syria, even though it decided—for political reasons—not
to act there.
Section IA considers the international intervention in aid of the
revolution in Libya. Section IB assesses the failure of the
international community to intervene in the Syrian revolution, which
has been a much more violent and blood-soaked civil conflict than
Libya was at the time of the intervention there. Section II analyzes a
legal argument put forth by a distinguished international lawyer,
Harold H. Koh, former Legal Advisor in the U.S. Department of
State, in favor of humanitarian intervention in Syria without Security
Council authorization. Section III considers the Iraq conflict in light
of relevant Security Council resolutions adopted after the
commencement of hostilities, and in light of the generally favorable
response of the international community to the Kosovo intervention,
6. For a similar argument in the context of international criminal law, see
David P. Forsythe, The UN Security Council and Response to Atrocities:
International Criminal Law and the P-5, 34 HUMAN RIGHTS Q. 840 (2012).
7. Many of the Bush Administrations international security policies, heavily
criticized by Barack Obama prior to the elections, were later adopted by the Obama
administration. See Elia Groll, Harold Koh’s Oxford Union speech: a Rorschach
test for the war on terror, FOREIGN POL’Y (May 9, 2013), http://blog.foreignpolicy.
com/posts/2013/05/09/harold_koh_s_oxford_union_speech_as_a_rorschach_test_f
or_the_war_on_terror.
8. See infra text accompanying notes 82–86; Robert J. Delahunty & John Yoo,
The “Bush Doctrine”: Can Preventive War Be Justified?, 32 HARV. J. L & PUB.
POL’Y 843, 844–45 (2009) (explaining the concept of the doctrine of preventive
war).
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where the Security Council gave its imprimatur to the political
settlement after the intervention.9 Though the Council did not
authorize the intervention itself, it has been argued in the case of
Kosovo that the war, if technically illegal, was nonetheless
legitimate, endorsing a view that, after all, “[i]t is sometimes
necessary to break the law to change it.”10 In the case of Iraq, where
very similar facts can be adduced, the scholarly commentary is
largely negative respecting the intervention, seemingly based more
on political than legal grounds. Finally, Section IV analyzes the
political, in contrast to the legal, considerations whereby the Security
Council allowed itself to deadlock recently on a Chapter VI
resolution respecting the Russian annexation of Crimea, through
Russia’s use of its veto,11 which occurred notwithstanding that
Russia, as a party to the dispute, was bound by the Charter to abstain
from voting.12
I.

TO INTERVENE, OR NOT TO INTERVENE, THAT IS THE QUESTION

On its face, it would appear that interventions in the internal
affairs of the Member States of the United Nations are strictly
outlawed except to the extent that the Security Council authorizes
such interventions. To begin with, the Charter states that “[a]ll
Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat
or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any state.”13 It should be noted that the Charter does
not merely require states to refrain from the use of force as an
instrument of international relations; it requires them also to refrain

9. See infra text accompanying notes 114–137; S.C. Res. 1244, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1244, at 1–2 (June 10, 1999) (welcoming the political solution and
agreement between Kosovo and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia).
10. Richard Falk, Legality and Legitimacy: The Quest for Principled
Flexibility and Restraint, 31 REV. INT’L STUDIES 33, 42 (2005) (quoting AnneMarie Slaughter).
11. See infra Section IV; see also Somini Sengupta, Russia Vetoes U.N.
Measure on Crimea; China Passes, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2014, at A13 (noting that
Russia was the only country that voted against a U.N. Security Council resolution
that declared the referendum on secession in Crimea illegal).
12. U.N. Charter art. 27, para 3.
13. Id. at art. 2, para. 4.
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from the threat to use force.14 The clear implication, therefore, is that
it is illegal to threaten to use force where it would be illegal actually
to use force. As expected, however, the Security Council has the
power to authorize the use of force, in derogation of the principle of
non-interference.15 The UN Charter states:
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall
authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters
which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction
of any state or shall require the Members to submit
such matters to settlement under the present Charter;
but this principle shall not prejudice the application of
enforcement measures under Chapter VII.16
At a bare minimum, therefore, where the Security Council finds
that an internal conflict constitutes a threat to international peace and
security,17 it may, consistent with the Charter, authorize Member
States to undertake actions that would otherwise be regarded as
purely internal—i.e., “within the domestic jurisdiction” of another
state.18
To be sure, it would be far too simplistic to say that the matter
ended there. Obviously, the history of the world over the past several
decades is replete with examples of UN Member States that have
intervened militarily in other states without UN authorization.
Kosovo is the paradigmatic case, where NATO conducted a
humanitarian intervention in the absence of UNSC authorization.19
Yet the absence of such authority has not generally led to much
criticism of the intervention in the literature. Even a UN-sponsored
14. Id. (“All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of
any state”).
15. See id. at arts. 39, 41, 42 (stating that when the Security Council
determines that there has been “any threat to the peace, breach of peace, or act of
aggression,” it may take measures that include authorizing the use of force).
16. Id. at art. 2, para. 7.
17. A determination that a breach or threat to international peace and security
has occurred is the predicate for the Council to act pursuant to its Chapter VII
powers. See id. art. 39.
18. Id. at art. 2, para. 7.
19. Susan L. Woodward, The Council and the Former Yugoslavia, in THE
UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL AND WAR 406, 438–439 (Vaughn Lowe et al.
eds., 2008).
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report that advocated for collective military action to occur only
under the auspices of the Security Council criticized the Council for
failing to authorize action in Kosovo, while praising NATO for
intervening militarily without such authority.20 Sections A and B will
consider the manner in which these issues developedin the context of
Libya and Syria.
A. The Case of Libya
In the days immediately prior to the rise of international calls to
intervene in its civil war in 2011, the Great Arab Libyan State-of-theMasses21 appeared to be a reasonably respected, reasonably wellintegrated member of the international community. Its days of
isolation, principally due to its role in the bombings of Pan Am 103
over Lockerbie22 and UTA 772 over Ténéré, were behind it.23 After
those bombings, a series of resolutions were put into place by the
Security Council, ultimately resulting in the imposition of Chapter
VII sanctions, which were to last for a decade.24 Finally, Libya
20. See Chairman of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change,
A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, ¶ 87, U.N. Doc. A/59/565 (Dec.
2, 2004) (noting that the United Nations, at times, failed to intervene in cases of
genocide, which led other parties, such as NATO, to intervene). For a discussion of
this report, especially in the context of the Iraq war, see Feisal Amin Istrabadi, The
High-Level Panel and the Use of Force in Iraq in 2003, 4 NW. U. J. INT’L HUM.
RTS. 146 (2005).
21. The word jamāhīrīyah is a neologism coined by Muammar Gadhafi and
usually translated as “state-of-the-masses.”
22. At least one seasoned journalist believes there is reason to question
whether Libya was responsible for the Lockerbie bombing, suggesting the
existence of evidence purportedly inculpating Iran for the bombing in retaliation for
the U.S. having shot down an Iranian civilian airliner in 1988. See Patrick
Cockburn, Three Years After Gaddafi, Libya Is Imploding into Chaos and Violence,
INDEP. (London) (Mar. 16, 2014 http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/commentato
rs/three-years-after-gaddafi-libya-is-imploding-into-chaos-and-violence-9194697.h
tml.
23. See generally Jonathan B. Schwartz, Dealing with a “Rogue State”:
the Libya Precedent, 101 AM. J. INT’L. L. 553 (2007) (explaining how the approach
taken by the United States regarding Libya after the bombings of Pan Am 103 and
UTA 772 resulted in Libya taking responsibility for the bombings, compensating
the victims of the bombings, and as a result having its U.S. designation as a state
sponsor of terrorism rescinded).
24. See S.C. Res. 731, U.N. Doc. S/RES/731 (Jan. 21, 1992) (condemning the
destruction of Pan Am flight 103 and UTA flight 772, urging Libya to respond to
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cooperated, discharging the obligations imposed by the Council,
resulting in the lifting of all sanctions in 2003.25 At about the same
time, Libya began co-operating with the International Atomic Energy
Agency in eliminating its nascent nuclear weapons program, although
whether it was prompted to do so by the removal of Saddam Hussein
is unclear.26
Libya’s reintegration into the family of civilized nations was not
long in coming. British Prime Minister Tony Blair flew to Tripoli to
meet with the Libyan strongman Muammar Gadhafi in 2004.27 After
Blair left office, he would make six more visits in the three-year
period from 2007-2010.28 Condoleezza Rice made an official visit to
Libya in 2008, the first U.S. Secretary of State to do so in fifty

requests to cooperate, and urging all states to encourage Libya to cooperate); S.C.
Res. 748, U.N. Doc. S/RES/748 (Mar. 31, 1992) (requiring Libya to comply with
resolution 731 and to cease support of any terrorist activity, and implementing
sanctions to prevent flights to and from Libya, limit sales and trade with Libya,
and hinder the travel of Libyan nationals); S.C. Res. 883, U.N. Doc. S/RES/883
(Nov. 11, 1993) (reaffirming all parts of resolutions 731 and 748, and implementing
sanctions which to freeze all financial resources owned or controlled by Libya,
eliminate Libyan Arab Airline operations outside of Libya, and further hinder
business with Libyan companies and nationals); S.C. Res. 1192, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1192 (Aug. 27, 1998) (reaffirming all parts of resolutions 731, 748 and 883,
and encouraging the trial of two persons charged with the bombing of Pan Am
flight 103).
25. See S.C. Res. 1506, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1506 (Sept. 12, 2003) (lifting the
sanctions implemented in resolutions 748 and 883); see also generally Bruce W.
Jentleson & Christopher A. Whytock, Who “Won” Libya? The Force-Diplomacy
Debate and Its Implications for Theory and Policy, 30 INT’L SECURITY 47 (2006)
(analyzing the different forms of diplomacy used with Libya during the past thirty
years and hypothesizing as to what led or contributed to Libya’s cooperation).
26. Libya: Overview, NUCLEAR THREAT INITIATIVE, http://www.nti.org/countr
y-profiles/libya/ (last updated Oct. 2003). There is reason to doubt that the war in
Iraq had much to do with Libya’s decision to disarm of weapons of mass
destruction. See Jentleson & Whytock, supra note 25, at 48. See also Ronald Bruce
St John, “Libya Is Not Iraq”: Preemptive Strikes, WMD, and Diplomacy, 58
MIDDLE EAST J. 386, 396-400 (2004) (noting and refuting President George W.
Bush’s claims that the Iraq war was instrumental in Libya’s disarmament).
27. Adrian Croft, UK's Blair: No regrets about befriending Gaddafi, REUTERS,
(Sep. 9, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/09/09/us-britain-blair-idUSTR
E78827P20110909.
28. Robert Mendick, Tony Blair's Six Secret Visits to Col Gaddafi, TELEGRAPH
(London) (Sept. 24, 2011), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/tony-blair/878
7074/Tony-Blairs-six-secret-visits-to-Col-Gaddafi.html.
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years.29 Perhaps most oddly, Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi
kissed the hand of the Libyan tyrant at a 2010 summit meeting.30
The international community itself, acting through the United
Nations, could have done no more to welcome home one of its own.31
A former Libyan foreign minister and minister of African Union
affairs was elected president of the sixty-fourth session of the United
Nations General Assembly (UNGA) in 2009.32 A year later, in 2010,
the UNGA elected Muammar Gadhafi’s Libya to the United Nations
Human Rights Council.33 It should be recalled the U.N. Human
Rights Council was created as a successor to the U.N. Human Rights
Commission, because the latter body was perceived as having lost
credibility by electing too many members that were themselves gross
violators of human rights.34 These considerations did not bar Libya’s
election to the successor body. For good measure, the Human Rights
Council produced a report in January 2011—virtually on the eve of
the Libyan civil war—in which most members waxed rhapsodic
about Libya’s improving human rights record.35 It must have been

29. Elise Labott, Rice Meets with Libya Leader, CNN (Sept. 5, 2008),
http://www.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/africa/09/05/libya.us/.
30. See Berlusconi's Gaddafi About-Face: Italian Prime Minister Shifts Libya
Stance, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 25, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/0
8/25/berlusconi-gaddafi-libya-stance-_n_936603.html (reporting that Berlusconi,
the then Italian Prime Minister, changed his opinion and views of Gaddafi to the
point that he kissed his hand during a summit). In response to Berlusconi’s flipflop, opposition politician Italo Bocchino said, “After having kissed a hand
dripping with blood, now he should kiss the hand representing those whose blood
was shed.” Id.
31. For a discussion of the early period of Libya’s reintegration into the state
system, see DIRK VANDEWALLE, LIBYA SINCE 1969: QADHAFI’S REVOLUTION
REVISITED 220–30 (2011).
32. Press Kit, Biography of H.E. Dr. Ali Abdussalam Treki, President of the
64th Session of the United Nations General Assembly (last visited Apr. 14, 2014),
http://www.un.org/ga/president/64/presskit/president.shtml.
33. Press Release, General Assembly, General Assembly Fills 14 Seats on
Human Rights Council; Approves Funds for Higher UN Troop, Police Levels in
Haiti; Sets Date for Communicable Diseases Meeting, U.N Press Release
GA/10939 (May 13, 2010).
34. UN Creates New Human Rights Body, BBC NEWS (Mar. 15, 2006),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4810538.stm.
35. See Human Rights Council, Report of the Working Group on the Universal
Periodic Review: Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/16/15, at 3 (Jan.
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quite an embarrassment for the UNGA that, by March of that year, it
had to suspend Libya’s membership from the human rights body
because of its brutal suppression of anti-government
demonstrations.36 If any delegation was red-faced by these facts,
none took the time to record its embarrassment.
By September 2011, opponents fighting the Libyan regime
claimed that the number of those killed in the Libyan civil war
approached 30,000, with an additional 50,000 wounded.37 Yet these
numbers failed to stand up to scrutiny, and the high casualty
estimates were very quickly discredited as gross exaggerations.
Journalists who consulted Libya’s morgues and international
organizations could confirm deaths at a rate of hundreds, perhaps into
four figures, not the tens of thousands claimed by regime
opponents.38 These are not numbers to be dismissed lightly; they are
horrific in their own right. Still, as these types of events usually
unfold, it is not the mass slaughter of civilians to which the
international community has seemingly become inured since the
middle of the last century.
The Security Council took its initial action in Libya toward the
end of February 2011, before UNGA’s action suspending Libya from
the Human Rights Council. The Council referred the Libyan matter
to the International Criminal Court (ICC) for acts committed since
February 15, 2011.39 It also imposed a sanctions regime that
included, inter alia, an arms embargo, and froze the assets of, and
banned travel by, certain named individuals.40 The result, perhaps

4, 2011) (reporting that numerous countries commended Libya for its commitment
to upholding human rights).
36. Press Release, General Assembly, General Assembly Suspends Libya from
Human Rights Council, U.N Press Release GA/11050 (Mar. 1, 2011).
37. See, e.g., Karin Laub, Libya: Estimated 30,000 Died In War; 4,000 Still
Missing, HUFFINGTON POST, Sept. 8, 2011, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/0
9/08/libya-war-died_n_953456.html (“At least 30,000 people were killed and
50,000 wounded in Libya's six-month civil war”).
38. See, e.g., Rod Nordland, Libya Counts More Martyrs than Bodies, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 16, 2011, at A1 (noting that, although reports stated that the number
of casualties were in the tens of thousands, the number of actual bodies in the
morgues and the number of those reported missing were in the hundreds).
39. S.C. Res. 1970, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1970 (Feb. 26, 2011).
40. Id. ¶¶ 9–21.
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predictably, was an increase in violence.41 On the same day that the
Security Council would vote to authorize military action, Gadhafi
threatened to massacre rebels in the eastern city of Benghazi.42 On
March 17, 2011, the UNSC passed a resolution authorizing Member
States and regional organizations to use all necessary measures “to
protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack.”43
It did not take long for NATO and its allies from a few Arab states to
commence military operations. By the end of the month, NATO’s
aerial bombardment had begun.44
Whatever the members of the Security Council thought they
were voting for, it became rather obvious early on that the actual
policy being followed by the coalition “protecting civilians” in Libya
was one of regime change.45 The White House let slip that it was
seeking to install a democratic regime in Libya, but had to deny that
regime change was its policy later the same day.46 There certainly
could be no doubt that regime change was the policy after NATO
bombed Gadhafi’s motorcade, resulting in the leader’s capture by
anti-government forces.47 Gadhafi was immediately bayoneted,
41. See e.g., The Crisis in Libya, INT’L COALITION FOR RESP. TO PROTECT 7–
10, http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/crises/crisis-in-libya?format=
pdf (last visited April 14, 2014).
42. David D. Kirkpatrick & Kareem Fahim, Qaddafi Warns of Assault on
Benghazi as U.N. Vote Nears, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 17, 2011), http://www.nytimes.co
m/2011/03/18/world/africa/18libya.html.
43. S.C. Res. 1973, supra note 2, ¶ 4.
44. See Operation Unified Protector: Responding to the United Nations’ Call,
N. ATL. TREATY ORG. (Mar. 22, 2011), http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_
71652.htm; See also e.g., Libya: US, UK and France Attack Gaddafi Forces, BBC
NEWS, Mar. 20, 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-12796972 (noting
that the United States, United Kingdom, and France began firing missiles at proGaddafi forces attacking Benghazi).
45. Ian Black, Libya Regime Change Is West's Goal, but Doubts Remain Over
How to Achieve It, GUARDIAN (London) (Apr. 15, 2011), http://www.theguardian.c
om/world/2011/apr/15/libya-regime-change-analysis.
46. Sam Youngman & Jordan Fabian, White House Denies Regime Change Is
Part of Libya Mission, THE HILL, (Mar. 22, 2011), http://thehill.com/homenews/ca
mpaign/151191-white-house-suggests-regime-change-is-goal-of-libya-mission.
47. See e.g., Death of a Dictator, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Oct. 17, 2012),
http://www.hrw.org/node/110724/ (detailing the last moments of Gaddafi’s life
including his attempt to flee, the bombing of his motorcade, and his death).
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dying of exsanguination later.48 The others captured with him,
including one of his sons, were also killed.49 That the killing of
prisoners constitutes a violation of international humanitarian law is
beyond cavil.50 Regardless of the horrors he inflicted upon the people
over whom he ruled so brutally for forty-two years, it was an
inauspicious beginning for the “democratization” of Libya.
On its face, the foregoing example of an international
intervention in Libya appears to be a paradigmatic case for such
interventions. A tyrant, who had ruled for forty-two years, was bent
upon the wholesale massacre of his own people, who had risen to
demand their basic human rights. The international community,
acting through the Security Council, attempted a step-by-step
approach, increasing pressure with each step. These steps included a
referral to the ICC, along with a series of sanctions, obviously
designed to compel the regime to engage with its own citizens.
When those efforts failed, the Council authorized the use of force to
protect the Libyan civilian population. Viewed from this perspective,
the Libyan example sets a salutary legal precedent of a “collective
response” to a common threat to international peace and security.
Closer examination of the facts raises skepticism, however.
Libya in 2011 could hardly be thought of as an example of an
ongoing mass atrocity. Without belittling the deaths of several
hundred people, these are not the typical numbers of a mass atrocity.
By contrast, the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
(ICTY) found that Srebrenica’s 40,000 Bosnian Muslims were

48. Id.
49. Id.
50. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 8, §2(b), July 17,
1998, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9 (encompassing the “[k]illing or wounding [of] a
combatant who, having laid down his arms or having no longer means of defence,
has surrendered at discretion” within the definition of a war crime). Reference to
the Rome Statute is particularly apposite, in light of the Security Council’s referral
of the situation in Libya to the ICC earlier in the year. Supra note 39; see also e.g.
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Sounded and Sick
in Armed Forces in the Field arts. 3, 12, 13, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75
U.N.T.S. 31; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949,
and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts
(Protocol II) art. 7, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609; Convention Against Torture
and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment art. 10, Dec. 10,
1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85.

130

MARYLAND JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [VOL. 29:119

targeted by Bosnian Serb forces for genocide.51 Some 8,000
civilians—men, women, and children—were killed in that embattled
city alone.52 Recalling that even these appalling losses were
insufficient to compel international intervention, it appears difficult
to draw out of Libya the larger legal proposition that the international
community will not tolerate abuses such as those visited by Gadhafi
on his people. Gadhafi’s abuses simply pale by comparison to much
graver breaches of human rights and humanitarian norms where the
international community simply did nothing.
Indeed, at least one Security Council permanent member, shortly
after NATO began its aerial bombardment of Libya, asserted that the
campaign in Libya was an abuse of Council resolutions,
notwithstanding the humanitarian circumstances. Ambassador Viatly
Churkin, representing the Russian Federation, explained:
The demand for a quick ceasefire turned into a fullfledged civil war, the humanitarian, social, economic
and military consequences of which transcend Libyan
borders. The situation in connection with the no-fly
zone has morphed into the bombing of oil refineries,
television stations and other civilian sites. The arms
embargo has morphed into a naval blockade in
western Libya, including a blockade of humanitarian
goods. Today the tragedy of Benghazi has spread to
other western Libyan towns—Sirte and Bani Walid.
These types of models should be excluded from global
practices once and for all.53
Admittedly, the Russian explanation of vote, made in reference
to its veto of the first Syrian resolution, was deeply cynical. Churkin
suggested, in effect, that the Russian Federation was surprised that
Resolution 1973 was used to bomb Libya’s governmental and
economic infrastructure. He said that NATO and its Arab allies
abused the intent of Resolution 1970 calling for a cease-fire and a nofly zone. He elided wholly the fact that NATO and allied action in
51. Prosecutor v. Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-A, Appellate Judgment, ¶ 15 n. 25
(Apr. 19, 2004).
52. Id. ¶ 2.
53. U.N. SCOR, 66th Sess., 6627th mtg. at 4, U.N. Doc. S/PV.6627 (Oct. 4,
2011) (emphasis added).
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Libya occurred pursuant to Resolution 1973, not 1970, and that
Russia voted to authorize the use of force. Still, he insisted that
action in Libya did not constitute a legal precedent, but an aberration.
Yet an even more cynical reading of the Council’s actions in
Libya suggests itself. The fact is that Muamar Gadhafi had spent
much of his tenure as the dictator of Libya with the status of an
international pariah.54 As noted, above, he had caused Libya to come
under a decade of sanctions because of his support for terrorist
activities.55 Indeed, his history of being accused of terrorism dates at
least to the days of the Reagan Administration, which bombed Libya
for its apparent involvement in the 1986 bombing of a discotheque
frequented by U.S. servicemen in Berlin.56 While it is true that
Western powers were beginning, to varying degrees, to seek
economic ties with Gadhafi’s Libya and its large oil reserves, there
had been a long history of deep tensions with the regime. Even the
Russian Federation made clear it had its own relatively tense
relationship with Gadhafi.57
Still, in this context, it is instructive to consider what has become
of Libya in the aftermath of the international intervention. The

54. See generally JOHN OAKES, LIBYA: THE HISTORY OF GADDAFI’S PARIAH
STATE (2011) (explaining the history of Libya under Gadhafi).
55. See Gaddafi’s 41-Year-Long Rule, WASH. POST (Feb. 23, 2011),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/world/gaddafis-rule-timeline/
(detailing sanctions from 1992 to 2003).
56. See Nathalie Malinarich, Flashback: The Berlin Disco Bombing, BBC
NEWS (Nov. 13, 2001), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/1653848.stm.
57. U.N. SCOR, 66th Sess., 6627th mtg., supra note 53, at 4 (denying the
existence of “special ties” between Russia and Libya, and noting that “a number of
States represented at this table”—read the western powers—“had warmer relations”
with Libya than did Russia).
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course in Libya over the past three years has not run smooth.58 The
state is faltering and is teetering on utter failure.59 The judiciary is in
imminent collapse, with courts suspended and prosecutions frozen.60
Militias roam the country and they are gaining, not losing, power.61
Old rivalries between Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, the western and
eastern parts of the country, have erupted again, and it is not clear
that the country can actually hold together.62 A renewed civil war is
a realistic imminent threat at this writing.63 In the meantime,
violations of international humanitarian law continue. A Human
Rights Watch report documents a “crime against humanity of mass

58. There were warnings even before the death of Gadhafi that early elections,
before the country was ready for them, could result in chaos and a renewed civil
war. See, e.g., Dawn Brancati & Jack L. Snyder, The Libyan Rebels and Electoral
Democracy: Why Rushing to the Polls Could Reignite Civil War, FOREIGN AFF.
(Sept. 2, 2011), http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/68241/dawn-brancati-andjack-l-snyder/the-libyan-rebels-and-electoral-democracy?cid=rss-rss_xmlthe_libyan_rebels_and_electora-000000 (the “proposal to hold elections within 18
months is imprudent”). In fact, ten months later, the first set of elections were held.
David D. Kirkpatrick, Election Results in Libya Break an Islamist Wave, N.Y.
TIMES, Jul. 9, 2012, at A1. Further elections for a constituent assembly were
recently held in February 2014. Carlotta Gall, Disillusionment in Libya Over Vote
on Charter Assembly, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 19, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/
02/20/world/africa/disillusionment-in-libya-over-vote-on-charter-assembly.html.
59. Osama Al Sharif, Libya on the Verge of Disintegration, ARAB NEWS (Nov.
20, 2013), http://www.arabnews.com/news/480086.
60. See Global Insider: Justice System on the Brink of Collapse in Libya’s
Security Vacuum, WORLD POL. REV. (Mar. 20, 2014), http://www.worldpoliticsrevi
ew.com/trend-lines/13642/global-insider-justice-system-on-the-brink-of-collapsein-libya-s-security-vacuum; Libya: Government Institutions at Risk of Collapse,
HUM. RTS. WATCH (Mar. 7, 2014), http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/03/07/libyagovernment-institutions-risk-collapse.
61. See Libya Lurches Toward Collapse After Tripoli Bloodbath, UNITED
PRESS INT’L (Nov. 18, 2013), http://www.upi.com/Top_News/Special/2013/11/18
/Libya-lurches-toward-collapse-after-Tripoli-bloodbath/UPI-95751384796521/
(describing “[t]he persistent violence and the growing power of the unruly militias
spawned by the 2011 civil war”); Cockburn, supra note 22.
62. Andres Gorzewski, Power Vacuum Threatens Libya, DEUTSCHE WELLE
(Mar. 3, 2014), http://www.dw.de/power-vacuum-threatens-libya/a-17493245.
63. Libya Lurches Toward Collapse After Tripoli Bloodbath, supra note 61.
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forced displacement,” in that 40,000 residents of Tawergha, removed
from their homes in 2011, have yet to be allowed to return.64
Economic collapse is also imminent. Of course, oil is Libya’s
principal export, and this sector has hardly fared better.65 Oil
production is currently down to approximately 20% of Libya’s peak,
pre-civil war production capacity.66 Cyrenaican militiamen are
selling oil illicitly, in open defiance of the government in Tripoli.67 A
U.S. Navy SEAL team recently intervened to seize an oil tanker
loaded with an illicit oil shipment, as the Libyan government was
impotent to stop it.68 Several days later, the UNSC passed yet
another resolution allowing Member States to use force in assisting
the Libyan Government to prevent illicit shipments of its oil.69 The
result of these latter developments has been to thrust Libya into even
further chaos.70
No crocodile tears will be shed here for the demise of Muammar
Gadhafi, a brutal tyrant who terrorized his own country for forty-two
years. That he has been deposited into the same ashcan containing
the unmourned remains of Saddam Hussein is, to be sure, a positive.
Yet it is all too glib to say that Libya is better off now without its
dictator. Other than the defeat of one dictator, by what measure can
the international community say convincingly that its intervention has
improved the lives of Libyans? It is true that there is at least hope for
64. Libya: End Impunity, Reform Repressive Laws, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Jan.
21, 2014), http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/01/21/libya-end-impunity-reform-repres
sive-laws.
65. See U.N. Resolution Authorizes Force Against Illicit Libyan Oil, UNITED
PRESS INT’L (Mar. 20, 2014 8:49 AM), http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Energ
y-Resources/2014/03/20/UN-resolution-authorizes-force-against-illicit-Libyanoil/UPI-17161395319776/ (estimating production at 346,000 barrels per day, down
from a pre-civil war peak of 1.6 million barrels per day)
66. See id. Other estimates, however, show that production is unstable at best,
and, over the same period, dipped to 230,000 barrels per day. Yousef Gamal ElDin, Libya's Oil Output Goes from Bad to Worse, CNBC (Feb. 25, 2014),
http://www.cnbc.com/id/101444323; Libya, OBSERVATORY OF ECON. COMPLEXITY,
http://atlas.media.mit.edu/profile/country/lby/ (last visited Apr. 14, 2014).
67. David D. Kirkpatrick, Libyan Militia Selling Oil, Defying the Government,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 2014, at A10.
68. David D. Kirkpatrick, SEAL Team Raids a Tanker and Thwarts a Militia’s
Bid to Sell Libyan Oil, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 2014, at A4.
69. S.C. Res. 2146, S/RES/2146 (Mar. 19, 2014)
70. David D. Kirkpatrick & Clifford Krauss, Libya’s Prime Minister Ousted in
Chaos Over Tanker, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2014, at A10.
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a better future, a likelihood foreclosed by Gadhafi and his plan for
one of his sons to succeed him.71 But the vague hope of a better
future, perhaps in the distant future, must be rather slim consolation
for living in a country currently in the throes of utter collapse.
In a real sense, Gadhafi was an easy political call. His Libya had
a history of being thought a bad actor. Ten years of sanctions were
adequate proof of that proposition. It had no patron in any of the
capitals of the permanent members of the Security Council, even if it
had rehabilitated itself largely before the wider international
community. To be sure, the Council said that it acted in terms of
upholding international legal norms defending civilians from the
heinous excesses of their own government. Gadhafi was making
threats to inflict mass casualties on his civilian population—an
obnoxious threat, but his regime had not yet actually carried it out.
But the truth is that Libya’s lack of a powerful state willing to defend
it at the UNSC made the international action in the country viable. It
was not the legal imperatives that compelled intervention. This point
can be definitively illustrated in the case of Syria, which represents a
genuine humanitarian crisis involving grave breaches of international
humanitarian norms—including the use of poison gases—yet where
the international community has utterly failed to act to protect
civilians.
B.

The Case of Syria

As the above-described events were unfolding in Libya, it was
not surprising that, as the Syrian civil war began to exact a heavy toll
on its population, calls for intervention in Syria arose.72 At this
writing, the death toll in Syria is estimated to be approximately
140,000, half of whom are civilians, including some 7,000 children.73
71. Ian Black, Libya Leader Muammar Gaddafi Will Leave No Obvious
Successor if He Goes, GUARDIAN (Feb. 21, 2011), http://www.theguardian.com/wo
rld/2011/feb/21/libya-leader-muammar-gaddafi.
72. See sources cited supra notes 4–5.
73. See Khalil Ashawi, Syria's Death Toll Now Exceeds 140,000: Activist
Group, REUTERS (Feb. 15, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/02/15/ussyria-crisis-toll-idUSBREA1E0HS20140215; Noah Rayman, Report: More Than
146,000 People Killed in Syrian Civil War, TIME (Mar. 13, 2014), http://www.time
.com/24077/syria-death-toll/.
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Yet, as the numbers of dead were mounting in late 2011, the Security
Council refused to authorize any humanitarian relief under Chapter
VII of the Charter. Western countries on the Council tabled an early
draft resolution authorizing the use of force, similar to Resolution
1973 on Libya, to avert the ongoing humanitarian catastrophe, but
China and Russia vetoed the measure.74
Other attempts by the Western powers on the Council to use the
Council’s Chapter VII powers to solve the Syrian crisis met with
equal resistance. Early in 2012, the Security Council tabled a draft
resolution that would have condemned the Syrian president, Bashar
Assad, for causing large numbers of civilian deaths.75 The Russian
Federation and China also vetoed this resolution.76 In the summer of
2012, Russia and China again vetoed a resolution that would have
imposed sanctions on the Syrian regime for failing to implement a
peace initiative sponsored by the United Nations.77 Even a peace
initiative that had the imprimatur of the world body itself could not
move Russia and China to refrain from exercising a veto. Finally,
literally as this article was in the process of its final editing, China
and the Russian Federation vetoed a resolution that sought to refer
the situation in Syria to the ICC for violations of international human
rights norms by all parties to the Syrian conflict.78
The tone of the UNSC members’ deliberations was remarkable,
and, in the experience of this author, quite unprecedented, at least in
the post-Cold War period. The U.S. Permanent Representative,
Ambassador Susan Rice, expressed her government’s being
“disgusted” by what she characterized as Russia’s and China’s
continuing to prevent the Council from fulfilling its role in bringing
peace to Syria.79 Other members of the Council expressed similar
74. See U.N. SCOR, 66th Sess., 6627th mtg., supra note 53, at 4; Russia and
China Veto Draft Security Council Resolution on Syria, UN NEWS CENTRE (Oct. 4,
2011), http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=39935#.U3X-KF64m8w.
75. S.C. Res. 538, U.N. Doc. S/2012/538 (July 19, 2012).
76. U.N. SCOR, 67th Sess., 6711th mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/PV.6711 (Feb. 4,
2012).
77. U.N. SCOR, 67th Sess., 6810 mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/PV.6810, (July 19,
2012); S.C. Res. 538, U.N. Doc. S/RES/538 (July 19, 2012); see also Rick
Gladstone, Friction at the U.N. as Russia and China Veto Another Resolution on
Syria Sanctions, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 2012, at A8.
78. Somini Sengupta, China and Russia Block Referral of Syria to Court, N.Y.
TIMES, May 23, 2014, at A3.
79. U.N. SCOR, 67th Sess., 6711th mtg., supra note 76, at 5.
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sentiments, also couched in rather undiplomatically blunt terms,
expressing frustration at the Sino-Russian veto of a resolution on
Syria. They expressed thinly veiled outrage at the Council’s inability
to protect civilians in a conflict targeting them by the tens of
thousands.80 The exchange between the representatives of the five
permanent members, again, was extraordinary and unlike anything
witnessed by the author in his eight-year diplomatic career. The
British, French, and American ambassadors, respectively, described
the veto as “appall[ing] . . . ghastly, dangerous and deplorable.”81
For their part, the Russian and Chinese ambassadors reciprocated
in kind. Ambassador Churkin described the Western powers as
“Pharisees . . . pushing their own geopolitical intentions, which have
nothing in common with the legitimate interests of the Syrian
people.”82 The Chinese ambassador, normally staid and an exemplar
of diplomatic correctness, accused his Western counterparts of
engaging in “old tricks” and of being “eager to interfere in the
internal affairs of other countries, to fuel the flames and to sow
discord.”83 It would be difficult to imagine a clearer evocation of the
Western powers’ intervention in Libya.
With an actual, ongoing humanitarian calamity unfolding in
Syria, the UNSC was thus in absolute deadlock.84 From a strictly
legal perspective, there should have been at a minimum a similar
intervention in Syria that occurred in Libya. After all, where the dead
numbered in the hundreds in Libya, they numbered in the tens of
thousands in Syria. Yet no intervention occurred because two Council
members absolutely refused to allow so much as even criticism of the
Assad regime to issue from the UNSC. To the extent that Libya may
be cited as a legal precedent in international law in support of
humanitarian intervention, then the non-intervention in Syria must
equally constitute a legal precedent in its own right. Yet, events
would break the deadlock on the Council insofar as dealing with
Syria is concerned.
80. U.N. SCOR, 67th Sess., 6810th mtg., supra note 77, at 2–5, 9–10.
81. Id. at 2–3, 10.
82. Id. at 8.
83. Id. at 14.
84. Rick Gladstone, After Council’s Deadlock, Syria Is Criticized at U.N.,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 2012, at A7.
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The critical event, of course, was the use of chemical weapons in
the battlefield in the summer of 2013. Though more than 100,000
people killed in the broader conflict by that point, the chemical attack
itself led to only 1500 deaths.85 This event gained added significance
because President Obama had made it clear that he regarded even the
movement of chemical weapons by the regime in Syria as a “red line”
that would provoke a response from the United States.86 One might
have been forgiven for assuming the American president would act
accordingly.
Indeed, for a period of time, it appeared that the United States
was preparing to take military action to punish the Syrian regime.
Susan Rice, by then the U.S. National Security Advisor, put forward
the Administration’s case to the American public respecting the need
for intervention. She stated:
Assad’s escalating use of chemical weapons threatens
the national security of the United States. And the
likelihood that, left unchecked, Assad will continue to
use these weapons again and again takes the Syrian
conflict to an entirely new level—by terrorizing
civilians, creating even greater refugee flows, and
raising the risk that deadly chemicals would spill
across borders into neighboring Turkey, Jordan,
Lebanon, and Iraq. Obviously, the use of chemical
weapons also directly threatens our closest ally in the
region, Israel, where people once again have readied
gas masks.
Every time chemical weapons are moved, unloaded,
and used on the battlefield, it raises the likelihood that
these weapons will fall into the hands of terrorists
active in Syria, including Assad’s ally Hezbollah and
al Qaeda affiliates. That prospect puts Americans at
risk of chemical attacks targeted at our soldiers and
85. Joby Warrick, More than 1,400 Killed in Syrian Chemical Weapons Attack,
U.S. Says, WASH. POST (Aug. 30, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/na
tional-security/nearly-1500-killed-in-syrian-chemical-weapons-attack-ussays/2013/08/30/b2864662-1196-11e3-85b6-d27422650fd5_story.html.
86. Peter Baker, et al., Off-the-Cuff Obama Line Put U.S. in Bind on Syria,
N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 2013, at A1.
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diplomats in the region and even potentially our
citizens at home.”87
The argument Rice advanced for a military response was
couched in terms of the threat that the use of chemical weapons posed
to the vital security of the United States, even though there was no
allegation that Syria had any intent whatsoever to attack the U.S.
itself. Rather, Rice made the case that such weapons could be
proliferated to non-state actors, and it was this latter group that might
presumably constitute a direct threat to the United States. She also
raised the specter that the use of such weapons constituted a threat to
regional allies, especially Israel. These arguments, advanced in late
2013, had a particularly familiar tone.
In the late 1990s, the Project for a New American Century, a
neoconservative think tank, issued a statement advocating the
overthrow of Saddam Hussein. This call to arms could have served as
a source for Rice’s remarks:
As a result, in the not-too-distant future we will be
unable to determine with any reasonable level of
confidence whether Iraq does or does not possess such
weapons. Such uncertainty will, by itself, have a
seriously destabilizing effect on the entire Middle
East. It hardly needs to be added that if Saddam does
acquire the capability to deliver weapons of mass
destruction, as he is almost certain to do if we
continue along the present course, the safety of
American troops in the region, of our friends and allies
like Israel and the moderate Arab states, and a
significant portion of the world’s supply of oil will all
be put at hazard.88
Indeed, President George W. Bush himself exhorted the
graduating cadets at West Point, saying:
87. Press Release, Susan E. Rice, National Security Advisor, White House
(Sept. 9, 2013), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/09/09/remarksprepared-delivery-national-security-advisor-susan-e-rice.
88. Letter from Elliott Abrams et al., Project for the New Am. Century, to
William J. Clinton, President of the United States (Jan. 26, 1998),
http://zfacts.com/zfacts.com/metaPage/lib/98-Rumsfeld-Iraq.pdf.
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We cannot defend America and our friends by hoping
for the best. We cannot put our faith in the word of
tyrants, who solemnly sign non-proliferation treaties,
and then systemically break them. If we wait for
threats to fully materialize, we will have waited too
long — Our security will require transforming the
military you will lead — a military that must be ready
to strike at a moment's notice in any dark corner of the
world. And our security will require all Americans to
be forward-looking and resolute, to be ready for
preemptive action when necessary to defend our
liberty and to defend our lives.89
It is difficult to distinguish between these three statements. The
latter two constitute what was to become the doctrine of preventive
war, whereby the United States would not wait for imminent threats
to develop before reserving the right to engage in what it regarded as
self-defense.90 This doctrine, which was largely rejected by the
international community during the Bush Administration,91
nonetheless appeared to live again in the Obama Administration’s
initially bellicose pronouncements about the use of chemical weapons
in Syria.92 Significantly, a senior Obama Administration official had
endorsed and adopted one of the four pillars of the Bush Doctrine,
that of preventive war.93 Of course, the United States did not go to
89. President George W. Bush, Graduation Speech at West Point (June 1,
2002).
90. See sources cited supra note 7.
91. See MARC WELLER, IRAQ AND THE USE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
143 (2010). Even the United Kingdom, America’s closest ally and its partner in the
war in Iraq in 2003, rejected the doctrine of preventive war. See Attorney General,
Attorney General's Advice on the Iraq War Iraq: Resolution 1441, 54 INT’L &
COMP. L. Q. 767, 768 (2003).
92. See Paul D. Shinkman, Robert Gates: Obama’s Red Line for Syria a
Serious Mistake, U.S. NEWS (Jan. 16, 2014), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/
2014/01/16/robert-gates-obamas-red-line-for-syria-a-serious-mistake;
Glenn
Kessler, President Obama and the “Red Line” on Syria’s Chemical Weapons,
WASH. POST (Sept. 6, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/fact-checker/w
p/2013/09/06/president-obama-and-the-red-line-on-syrias-chemical-weapons/.
93. See National Security Council, Prevent Our Enemies from Threatening Us,
Our Allies, and Our Friends with Weapons of Mass Destruction in THE NATIONAL
SECURITY STRATEGY 13–16 (2002) available at http://www.state.gov/documents/or
ganization/63562.pdf. See also Robert Jervis, Why the Bush Doctrine Cannot Be
Sustained, 120 POLITICAL SCIENCE Q. 351, 351 (2003) (“A third major element of
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war in Syria after the violation of Obama’s red line. Instead, the
Security Council passed Resolution 2118, under Chapter VI—with
the agreement of the Syrian government—requiring Syria to disgorge
its chemical weapons stockpiles, but containing no enforcement
provisions.94
In the period after the Syrian regime used its chemical weapons
but before the UNSC acted, both the United States and the United
Kingdom appeared headed toward a military response in Syria.95 Yet
the British prime minister submitted the matter for a vote by the
House of Commons—a step not required by the British constitution.96
The House refused to authorize the use of force even in light of the
chemical attack.97 That left the United States by itself, but, in time, it
became unnecessary to act militarily, as the Russians brokered the
agreement that resulted in Resolution 2118.98
It is simply unsustainable to argue that considerations of
humanitarian intervention or the responsibility to protect have played
any genuine role in Syria. No state has, for instance, invoked the
precedent of Kosovo to justify an intervention in Syria,
the Bush Doctrine is that deterrence and even defense are not fully adequate to deal
with these dangers and so the United States must be prepared to take preventive
actions, including war, if need be”).
94. S.C. Res. 2118, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1325 (Sept. 27, 2013).
95. See Andrew Osborn et al., Iraq War Ghosts End UK Plans to Take Part in
Syria Action, REUTERS, Aug. 30, 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/08/30/
us-syria-crisis-britain-idUSBRE97R1BD20130830.
96. The constitutional power of the British prime minister to commit troops to
war without parliamentary approval derives from the ancient privilege of the king
as sovereign and commander-in-chief, though only parliament has the
constitutional power to allocate funds for war. See John C. Yoo, The Continuation
of Politics by Other Means: The Original Understanding of War Powers, 84 CALIF.
L. REV. 167, 197-218 (1996). See also Oren Dorell & Kim Hjelmgaard, Britain
Will Not Join USA in Strike on Syria, USA TODAY (Aug. 30, 2013),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2013/08/29/syria-united-kingdomdebate/2725999/ (describing how the House of Commons “voted against military
action in [sic] Syria”).
97. Mark Landler et al., Obama Set for Limited Strike on Syria as British Vote
No, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 2013, at A1.
98. See Martin Chulov, Syria Chemical Weapons Claims Need Referral From
State Body, Say Inspectors, GUARDIAN (Apr. 11, 2014), http://www.theguardian.co
m/world/2014/apr/11/syria-chemical-weapons-inspection-team-probe-attack.
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notwithstanding that the humanitarian crisis in Syria eclipses that in
Kosovo (and Libya).99 Quite the contrary, the absence of UNSC
approval has apparently caused the states that had advocated action to
freeze. Indeed, what caused the western powers to contemplate
taking military action in Syria was not the 140,000 dead in two years;
instead, it was the use of chemical weapons.
More precisely, what caused the United States to threaten
military action was almost certainly the fear that chemical weapons
could proliferate in a dangerous region. The rationale appears to
have been that, in the Middle East, too many non-state actors lurk,
actors whose agendas are hostile to the U.S. These are perfectly
legitimate policy considerations. The United States perceived a
comparatively remote threat, and considered undertaking action to
eliminate that threat. This consideration is not a legal one because
the threat is too remote (though it could rise to becoming one if the
threat were imminent). But it is a valid a policy consideration. It was
thus policy that dictated the apparent resolve of the United States
(and the Government of the United Kingdom) to face down the
Syrian regime after it used chemical weapons, and it was politics in
the rawest sense of the word that dictated the backing away of these
powers from the use of force. Military interventions had become
particularly unpopular in both the United States and the United
Kingdom, two countries that, to varying degrees, had been at war
since 2001, and whose populations wanted no more.100 Law simply
has not been the primary motivation respecting the decisions
policymakers have made hitherto in Syria.
Russia’s position is also quite interesting. One Russia expert,
Roy Allison, maintains that there are several reasons for Russia’s
steadfast support of the Syrian regime.101 First, he notes that there
99. For a discussion of Kosovo see infra Part II.
100. See Richard Norton-Taylor, Afghanistan War Has Cost Britain More than
£37bn, New Book Claims, GUARDIAN (May 29, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com
/world/2013/may/30/afghanistan-war-cost-britain-37bn-book (detailing the variety
of losses endured by the United Kingdom resulting from its involvement in the
Afghanistan intervention); see also Editorial, Britain’s Syria Vote in Perspective,
N.Y. TIMES, Sep. 4, 2013, A22 (“Parliament’s vote reflected British public opinion,
which, as in most of Europe, does not favor any military involvement in the Syrian
civil war”); Mark Landler & Megan Thee-Brenan, Survey Reveals Scant Backing
for Syria Strike, N.Y. TIMES, Sep. 10, 2013, at A1.
101. Roy Allison, Russia and Syria: Explaining Alignment with a Regime in
Crisis, 89 INT’L AFFAIRS 795, 801 (2013).
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has been a long-standing alliance between Syria and the Soviet
Union, dating from 1970.102 Russian President Vladimir Putin may
be reluctant to appear to be undermining a regime with which Russia
has had so long-standing an alliance, lest other leaders, especially in
the former Soviet Central Asian Republics, become leery of
Moscow’s friendship.103 Russia is also concerned that, should the
Assad regime fall, chaos might ensue, resulting in the emergence of a
radical Islamist threat in Russia’s backyard, as it were.104
Significantly, Putin is also highly skeptical of foreign interventions in
aid of revolutions against long-lived regimes, believing that the
discourse of democratization and the establishment of the rule of law
“are all little more than contrivances that allow the West to control
weaker nations.”105 The Russians may state their objections to action
in Syria in terms of legal principles; however, Allison makes a
convincing case that they are playing a hardball game of Realpolitik
of the first order.
For what it is worth, the Russians apparently believe—or at least
say they do—that Western powers are doing the same. Allison
quotes Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov as saying that his
Western counterparts are not interested in Assad per se, but, rather,
“They openly say that it is necessary to deprive Iran of a very close
ally.”106 There may be some validity to this view. What is clear, in
any event, is that the Western powers on the Security Council have
not been particularly vocal about affairs in Syria since the chemical
weapons issue was resolved with the Syrian regime. Resolution 2118
has reduced the threat of proliferation of these weapons from Syria.
It may be entirely coincidental that the silence of Western powers
about Syria occurred at almost the same time that their diplomatic
relations with Iran began to thaw.107

102. Id.
103. Id. at 804.
104. Id. at 809, 816.
105. Id. at 815 (footnote omitted).
106. Id. at 808 (footnote omitted).
107. Barak Ravid, Kerry to meet Iranian counterpart on sidelines of UN
General Assembly, HAARETZ, (Sep. 22, 2013), http://www.haaretz.com/news/middl
e-east/1.548534.
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II. ASSESSING A LEGAL CASE FOR INTERVENTION IN SYRIA
Amongst the most prominent advocates of military intervention
in Syria is Harold H. Koh, a former U.S. State Department legal
advisor. In his view, a sufficient humanitarian crisis obtained such
that Security Council authorization is not required for the United
States to initiate a humanitarian intervention. Koh’s assessment is not
driven, in the first instance, by an overarching legal theory. He
justifies his view thus:
On reflection, a “per se illegal” rule [i.e., in the
absence of Council approval] is plainly overbroad. If
no self-defense considerations arose, such a rule
would permanently disable any external collective
action, for example, to protect the population of any
U.N. permanent member state from genocide. By
treating the veto alone as dispositive, the per se
position denies any nation, no matter how wellmeaning, any lawful way to use even limited and
multilateral force to prevent Assad from intentionally
gassing a million Syrian children tomorrow. In the
name of fidelity to the U.N. and this rigid conception
of international law, leaders would either have to
accept civilian slaughter or break the law, because
international law offers no lawful alternative to
prevent the slaughter. The question not asked is
whether preventing that slaughter would further the
purposes of international law and the U.N. system far
more than a rigid reading of Article 2(4) that
privileges
one
systemic
value—territorial
sovereignty—over all others. 108
At best, Koh balances competing legal interests. On the one
hand there is a world legal order that is antithetical to the use of force
in the absence of consensus of the world’s major powers on the
Security Council, and, on the other, a legal architecture that
108. See Harold Hongju Koh, Syria and the Law of Humanitarian Intervention
(Part II: International Law and the Way Forward), JUST SECURITY (Oct. 2, 2013),
http://justsecurity.org/2013/10/02/koh-syria-part2/; see also Charlie Savage &
Mark Landler, White House Defends Continuing U.S. Role in Libya Operation,
N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 2011, at A16 (describing Mr. Koh’s support, in spite of
plentiful dissent, for intervention in Libya).
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ostensibly protects the basic rights of individuals against gross abuses
of fundamental human rights.109 The twin doctrines of humanitarian
intervention and the responsibility to protect have grown from the
latter, and Koh weighs in on the side of these humanitarian
considerations in advocating for intervention in places such as
Syria.110 This is a predilection dictated by policy, not legality. An
analyst, eschewing the chaos that could ensue from allowing
individual states to determine where and when to intervene based
upon their understanding of the customary international law on
interventions, could articulate as sound an argument against nonauthorized interventions.111 Again, these are policy debates: no sound
legal principle impels the follower of the debate in one direction or
another.
While Koh’s analysis involves several dimensions, he sets forth
an initial three-prong test for determining whether an intervention in
Syria would constitute a lawful military action, absent Council
authorization. The test is:
[1] If a humanitarian crisis creates consequences
significantly disruptive of international order—
including proliferation of chemical weapons, massive
refugee outflows, and events destabilizing to regional
peace and security of the region– that would likely
soon create an imminent threat to the acting nations
(which would give rise to an urgent need to act in
individual and collective self-defense under Article
51);

109. Perhaps Koh belongs to the group of scholars who do not see the two
bodies of law as distinct and in competition, but who instead see ever-increasing
“complex connections between security and humanitarianism.” MICHAEL N.
BARNETT, THE INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN ORDER 4 (2010).
110. See Koh, supra note 108.
111. See, e.g., Eric A. Posner, International Law: A Welfarist Approach, 73 U.
CHI. L. REV. 487, 541–542 (2006) (“…we must stay with the status quo, which
means tolerating humanitarian crises, even genocide, on the ground that unilateral
intervention would make long-term aggression more likely.”); DAVID CHANDLER,
FROM KOSOVO TO KABUL AND BEYOND: HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL
INTERVENTION (new ed. 2006) (critiquing the development in human rights
discourse).
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[2] a Security Council resolution were [sic] not
available because of persistent veto; and the group of
nations that had persistently sought Security Council
action had exhausted all other remedies reasonably
available under the circumstances, they would not
violate U.N. Charter Article 2(4) if they used
[3] limited force for genuinely humanitarian purposes
that was necessary and proportionate to address the
imminent threat, would demonstrably improve the
humanitarian situation, and would terminate as soon as
the threat is abated.112
Each of Koh’s three prongs is problematic.
Koh’s first prong requires the existence of a situation that is
“significantly disruptive of the international order.”113 The difficulty
Koh has with this prong is that it appears to be a mere recharacterization of the phrase “breach or threat to international peace
and security.”114 Of course a determination of the existence of the
latter is, par excellence, within the competence of the Security
Council in the exercise of its Chapter VII enforcement powers.
Merely describing such a threat with different words cannot avoid
this basic fact, nor can it strip the Council of its prerogatives. It is
one thing to claim for individual states the right to make
determinations that are variants of the inherent right of self-defense
enshrined in Article 51 of the Charter.115 It is another thing entirely
112. See Koh, supra note 108.
113. Id.
114. The U.N. Charter at art. 39 states:The Security Council shall determine
the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression
and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in
accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and
security. See also Christine Gray, The Charter Limitations on the Use of Force:
Theory and Practice, in THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL AND WAR 86
(Vaughn Lowe et al. eds., 2008); The Legal Department of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of the Russian Federation, Legal Assessment of the Use of Force against
Iraq, 52 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 1059, 1062 (2003).
115. U.N. Charter art. 51 states in pertinent part:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of
individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a
Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken
measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.
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simply to arrogate to each state the right to second-guess the Council,
making its own determination as to what constitutes a threat to the
world order, even where the Security Council cannot perceive (at
least collectively) such a threat. And it is yet another matter
altogether simply to declare doing so legal, the Charter’s provision to
the contrary notwithstanding.
The second prong involves the right of states to take unilateral
action where the Council is deadlocked due to a veto and such states
have exhausted other remedies.116 In such circumstances, Koh
asserts that states would not violate the Charter by acting without
Council sanction. Fundamentally, Koh appears to regard the
existence of a persistent veto as somehow representing a failure of
the Charter system. Yet it is by design that the Council can authorize
action only where sufficient political agreement amongst the
permanent members exists, such that none of them exercises the
veto.117 Moreover, the fact that a resolution has not issued from the
Council does not mean that the Council has not acted. It is equally
plausible to conclude that the Council has considered whether a
situation constitutes a threat to international peace and security, and
that it has found that it does not. A refusal of the Council, even
through the exercise of a veto, to authorize action is not a failure of
the U.N. Charter system. It is in fact the way the system was
intended : the Charter dictates that action should only occur when the
permanent members (plus four other states) can forge a sufficient
political consensus that a situation constitutes a threat to peace and
security.
Koh’s third prong deals with the use of proportionate force for a
humanitarian purpose that “would demonstrably improve the
humanitarian situation.”118
To begin with, “demonstrably”
improving the humanitarian situation can surely be measured only in
retrospect. As such, it is a doctrine of dubious utility in judging the
legality of an intervention prospectively. Koh cites the Libya
example as a salutary one for the removal of a despot threatening his
people.119 Yet the results in Libya have been, in one perspective at
116. Koh, supra note 108.
117. See U.N. Charter art. 27, para. 3.
118. Koh, supra note 108.
119. Id.
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least, utterly disastrous. Other than the removal of a despotic regime
itself, Libya seems far worse off by many measures.120 Who can
gainsay that chaos might actually be worse than tyranny?
The international community has neither unlimited resources nor
unlimited capacity to devote to the well-being of peoples recently
liberated from the depredations of long-lived tyrannical regimes.
Citizens of intervening states have limited patience and often an
equally limited inclination to expend their taxes on institutionbuilding on a large scale in foreign countries.121 These considerations
must surely play a role in assessing the capacity the international
community and individual states have in ensuring a demonstrable
improvement in the humanitarian exigencies of states such as Libya
and Syria. If Koh can cite Kosovo as a successful intervention in
support of his three-prong test, he must also acknowledge the
profound fiasco in Libya, amongst other places.
Though Koh is clearly a publicist for the notion that Kosovo
stands for the legality in some circumstances of foreign interventions
in the absence of Security Council authorization, he cannot
demonstrate convincingly that such a legal principle is in fact
cognizable as a matter of customary international law. Two of his
three prongs, indeed, contain strong policy arguments: exhaustion
and demonstrable improvement. This fact underscores that Koh very
quickly reaches the limits of law and encroaches on policy and
politics in international affairs. It is not surprising that that should be
so. The current international system, however it may appear to be
sophisticated, is still developing, having been created in 1945.
Moreover, arguments respecting humanitarian intervention and the
responsibility to protect have barely been extant for two decades, and
remain controversial in the legal academic literature, let alone in
policy circles.122 Furthermore, in the absence of an efficient
international policing power, states—especially the powerful—still
calculate their respective self-interest at least as often as legality in
their foreign affairs. Legality, then, offers no greater a limit in this
arena than do politics and policy; indeed, it may offer far less, as the
Syria example shows.
III. LEGALITY AND POLITICS IN IRAQ
120. See supra text accompanying notes 56–67.
121. See sources cited supra note 100.
122. See sources cited supra note 111.
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In Iraq, of course, the original intervention led by the United
States and the United Kingdom in 2003 was extremely controversial
from a legal (and political) perspective. Many trees have been felled
to publish denunciations of that war as “illegal,” especially under the
UN Charter.123 It is true that the UN Security Council did not reauthorize the use of force to enforce its demands that Iraq disarm
itself to the satisfaction of weapons inspectors.124 It did, however, in
advance of the 2003 conflict and acting under Chapter VII of the
Charter, find, that Iraq was in “material breach of its obligations” to
disarm itself of weapons of mass destruction under prior Security
Council resolutions.125 This finding, made in November 2002, gave
the “coalition of the willing” at least some ostensible authority to
commence hostilities to enforce the disarmament resolutions.126
Indeed, as late as May 2003—the ninth week after the
commencement of hostilities—the Security Council re-affirmed
Iraq’s Chapter VII obligation to disarm itself of weapons of mass
destruction.127 Notwithstanding the foregoing, it remains that that the
Security Council staunchly refused to re-authorize the use of force in
Iraq.

123. See, e.g., David Krieger, The War in Iraq as Illegal and Illegitimate, in
The IRAQ CRISIS AND WORLD ORDER 381 (Ramesh Thakur & Waheguru Pal Singh
Sidhu, eds., 2006); Hans Corell, Authorization for State-Building Missions: Legal
Issues Related to Their Creation and Management, 99 AM. SOC’Y OF INT’L L.
PROC. 31, 35 (2005) (citing the violation of the Charter by two Security Council
members); Harold Hongju Koh, Address at the Oxford Union: How to End the
Forever
War?
(May
7,
2013),
http://www.lawfareblog.com/wpcontent/uploads/2013/05/2013-5-7-corrected-koh-oxford-union-speech-asdelivered.pdf (citing the invasion of Iraq as being amongst the acts that were
“foolish, illegal or inconsistent with American values”) analyzed in Groll, supra
note 7.
124. See Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Holds Iraq in
‘Material Breach’ of Disarmament Obligations, Offers Final Chance to Comply,
Unanimously Adopting Resolution 1441 (2002), U.N. Press Release SC/7564
(Aug. 11, 2002) [hereinafter Security Council Holds Iraq in ‘Material Breach’].
125. S.C. Res. 1441, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1441 (Nov. 8, 2002).
126. See Security Council Holds Iraq in ‘Material Breach,’ supra note 124
(“The representative of the United States noted that, while primary responsibility
rested with the Council for the disarmament of Iraq, nothing in the resolution
constrained any Member State from acting to defend itself against the threat posed
by that country, or to enforce United Nations resolutions protecting world peace
and security.”).
127. S.C. Res. 1483, ¶11, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1483 (May 22, 2003).
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Still, the Security Council did formally recognize post hoc the
occupation forces in Iraq.128 It charged them with specific duties,129
though it also reminded them of the “temporary nature of the exercise
. . . of the specific responsibilities, authorities, and obligations”
granted in resolution 1483.130 Perhaps more significantly, as a
nascent insurgency first began by October 2003, the Security
Council, acting under its Chapter VII powers, authorized the creation
of a multinational force (MNF-I) “to take all necessary measures to
contribute to the maintenance of security and stability in Iraq.”131
The MNF-I was to be under a “unified command,” effectively a
euphemism for the U.S. command structure.132
The UNSC did not merely authorize this function for the states
that had already invaded and occupied Iraq. Rather, it expressly
urged other U.N. Member States to contribute military forces under
“this United Nations mandate.”133 The MNF-I mandate was extended
in 2004,134 2005,135 2006,136 and 2007.137 It finally expired at the end
of 2008,138 by which time the United States and Iraq signed a
bilateral agreement allowing U.S. forces to remain in Iraq through the
end of 2011.139
It is interesting to compare the intervention in Iraq with that of
the NATO intervention in Kosovo. To date history continues to treat
the latter much better, and not just because the Iraq war has failed to
engender stable political and legal institutions or even a diminution in
128. Id. at 2.
129. Id. ¶¶ 4–6, 13.
130. S.C. Res. 1511, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1511 (Oct. 16, 2003).
131. Id. ¶ 13.
132. Id.
133. Id. ¶ 14.
134. S.C. Res. 1546, ¶ 9, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1546 (June 8, 2004).
135. S.C. Res. 1619, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1619 (Aug. 11, 2005).
136. S.C. Res. 1723, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1723 (Nov. 28, 2006).
137. S.C. Res. 1790, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1790 (Dec. 18, 2007). For a
discussion of the Security Council’s annual extensions of the MNF-I mandate, see
M. Cherif Bassiouni, supra note 3, at 3–9.
138. See S.C. Res. 1859, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1859, at 2 (Dec. 22, 2008) (noting
that the mandate of the MNF would expire as on December 31, 2008).
139. Strategic Framework Agreement for a Relationship of Friendship and
Cooperation, U.S.-Iraq art. 24, Nov. 17, 2008, TIAS 09-101.1. See also Bassiouni,
supra note 3, at 9–15.
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violence rates.140 Legal scholars argue, at a minimum, that the
intervention in Kosovo was legitimate if not legal, but others have
gone further.141 No less an authority than Harold Koh has argued that
the Security Council’s passage of Resolution 1244 has a significant
post hoc legal effect.142 He maintains that once the UNSC approved
the political settlement in Kosovo, it “effectively ratif[ied] the NATO
action under international law.”143
It is unlikely that supporters of this line of reasoning, on the
other hand, would argue that post hoc action by the Council
constitutes a ratification of the 2003 war in Iraq. Yet the UNSC did
more than merely create a mandate for the MNF-I and renew it
annually over a period of half a decade. It also repeatedly endorsed
the unfolding political processes both during and after the legal
occupation of Iraq. A thumbnail sketch of the Council’s actions
follows.
To begin with, the Council made specific provisions for the
political and legal reconstruction of the country, tasking the Special
Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG), “in coordination
with the [occupation] Authority,” to undertake certain specific
tasks.144 It also welcomed the establishment of the Iraqi Governing
Council (IGC), appointed by the U.S. Administrator in Iraq, as an
advisory body.145 When the IGC appointed a cabinet, the Security
Council endorsed the appointment and determined that the IGC and
its cabinet temporarily embodied the sovereignty of Iraq, pending the
establishment of an internationally recognized representative
140. At the time of the author’s final edit of this article, the state of Iraq
appears In imminent collapse as a coalition of insurgent groups has overtaken large
swaths of the country north of Baghdad, the Iraqi Army collapsed in those areas,
Shii militias are ascendant again, and the Iraqi Kurdistan region appears poised on
the verge of declaring its independence.
141. See David Wippman, Kosovo and the Limits of International Law,
FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 129, 130 (2001) (explaining that some scholars see
intervention in Kosovo as technically illegal because the Security Council did not
authorize it, while others justify the intervention under humanitarian or emergency
law).
142. S.C. Res. 1244, S/RES/1244 (June 10, 1999).
143. Koh, supra note 108.
144. S.C. Res. 1483, supra note 127, ¶ 8.
145. S.C. Res. 1500, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1500 (Dec. 18, 2007).

2014]

ASSESSING RECENT INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTIONS

151

government.146 The Security Council later endorsed the formation of
the first post-2003 sovereign Iraqi Interim Government.147
Aside from the political developments and providing for Iraq’s
security, the Council also became deeply enmeshed in protecting the
economic resources and development of the country. Within weeks of
the occupation of the country, the Council lifted “all prohibitions
related to trade with Iraq and the provision of financial or economic
resources.”148
Using its Chapter VII powers, it created the
Development Fund for Iraq (DFI)149 and immunized its assets from
levy or other attachment or garnishment.150
It required the
occupation authority to sell Iraq’s petroleum and natural gas products
pursuant to prevailing international best practices and also protected
the proceeds from levy by requiring their deposit into the DFI.151 As
with the case of the MNF-I, the Council repeatedly extended these
protections over the years.152
Thus, as in the case of UNSC action with respect to Kosovo, it
appears that the Council fully and repeatedly over the years endorsed
the “settlement” in Iraq, even though it did not authorize the initial
use of force in 2003. Yet no legal analyst to the author’s knowledge
has argued that such post hoc action by the Council legitimated the
United States and United Kingdom and allied action in Iraq. The
legal distinctions between the two cases seem rather minimal. What
more probably distinguishes them is the political assessment of the
desirability of the action taken. The Kosovo action was thought to
have been a moral good, a salutary precedent for future analogous
situations. Iraq is seen as the opposite, a hyperpower throwing its
weight around, with a few countries willing to go along, but without
146. S.C. Res. 1511, supra note 130, ¶¶ 3–4.
147. S.C. Res. 1546, supra note 134, ¶ 1.
148. S.C. Res. 1483, supra note 127, ¶ 10.
149. Id. ¶ 12.
150. Id. ¶ 22. The initial period of immunity was until 31 December 2007. Id.
151. Id. ¶ 20. There was an exception requiring Iraq to pay 5% of the proceeds
of the sale of its petroleum products to discharge the judgments entered against it in
the United Nations Compensation Commission (UNCC). Id. ¶ 21. The UNCC was
a tribunal commission established to compensate victims who alleged they had
suffered economic harm as a consequence of Iraq’s illegal invasion and occupation
of Kuwait. S.C. Res. 687, ¶ 16–18, U.N. Doc. S/RES/687 (Apr. 8, 1991).
152. S.C. Res. 1790, supra note 137, ¶ 3; S.C. Res. 1859, supra note 138, ¶ 1;
S.C. Res. 1905, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1905 (Dec. 21, 2009). The immunities
terminated on 31 December 2010 and were not renewed.
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justification. Perhaps the legal proposition reduces to the aphorism
that “there is nothing either good or bad, but thinking makes it so.”153
As a final and perhaps tangential consideration, Koh also notes
the fact the nineteen members of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization believed that its actions in Kosovo were legal.154 To
Koh, this is evidence of the legality of the actions in Kosovo as a
matter of customary law, notwithstanding the lack of Security
Council authorization. Taking the point, at least forty-nine nations
participated in one way or another, becoming members of the
“coalition of the willing” in Iraq.155 Of the forty-nine states, eighteen
were current or future members of the expanded NATO.156 Other
members of the coalition included Australia, Japan, and South
Korea.157 While other long-standing members of NATO such as
France and Germany did not share this assessment of the legality of
the actions in Iraq, both actively supported (for Germany, while it
was on the Council, at least) the long litany of resolutions passed in
support of the occupation and its aftermath.158
Though some commentators argue that Kosovo, though illegal,
was legitimate because a mass slaughter was stopped, similar
arguments are rarely if ever made in Iraq, where a maniacal tyrant at
least was overthrown. In fairness, it may well be that the end result
in Iraq—the chaos and bloodshed that has ensued over the years, the
153. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET act 2, sc. 2.
154. Koh, supra note 108.
155. Press Release, The White House, Operation Iraqi Freedom: Coalition
Members (Mar. 27, 2003), http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/relea
ses/2003/03/20030327-10.html [hereinafter Operation Iraqi Freedom: Coalition
Members].
156. These countries included Albania (2009), Bulgaria (2004), Czech
Republic (1999), Denmark, Hungary (1999), Iceland, Italy, Latvia (2004),
Lithuania (2004), the Netherlands, Poland (1999), Portugal, Romania (2004),
Slovakia (2004), Spain (1982), Turkey (1952), and, of course, the United Kingdom
and the United States. Member Countries, N. ATL. TREATY ORG.,
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_52044.htm (last visited Apr. 17, 2014).
The years in parentheses indicates the year of entry into NATO of the non-original
members. The Organization now has twenty-eight members. Id.
157. Operation Iraqi Freedom: Coalition Members, supra note 154.
158. Germany happened to be an elected member of the Security Council in
2003 and 2004. U.N. Security Council, Countries Elected Members of the Security
Council (last visited May 14, 2014), http://www.un.org/en/sc/members/elected.asp.
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violence and concomitant apparent imminent collapse of the state that
are underway at this writing—perhaps contributes to the sense of
illegitimacy. But if, as Koh holds, subsequent action by the Council
confers legality on Kosovo, it is difficult to articulate a reasoned
argument why subsequent action by the Council does not have the
same salutary effect on the invasion in Iraq. The intervention in Iraq,
it seems was always—and perhaps will always be—politically
anathema.
IV. AN EXCURSUS FROM THE MIDDLE EAST: THE CRIMEA AFFAIR
That politics trump legality could not have been more clearly
demonstrated than in the recent dispute over the Russian Federation’s
occupation and annexation of Crimea.159 Forty-two UN Member
States submitted a draft resolution for action by the Security
Council.160 The draft, inter alia, recognized the sovereignty and
territorial integrity of Ukraine, and called upon “all parties to pursue
immediately the peaceful resolution” of the dispute.161 It also
declared the hastily-arranged referendum in Crimea invalid, but
called upon the Ukrainian government “to continue to respect and
uphold its obligations under international law and to protect the rights
of all persons in Ukraine, including the rights of persons belonging to
minorities.”162 Predictably, the Russians vetoed the draft resolution,
which garnered thirteen votes (and a Chinese abstention).163
Significantly, the draft resolution was brought under Chapter VI
of the UN Charter. The peaceful resolution of disputes called for in
the text is, par excellence, the exercise of the Council’s powers under
Chapter VI.164 Such an exercise of the Council’s prerogatives is in
159. See Steven Lee Myers & Ellen Barry, Putin Reclaims Crimea for Russia
and Bitterly Denounces the West, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 2014, at A1.
160. Draft Security Council Resolution on Ukraine and Crimea, in draft dated
Mar. 15, 2014, U.N. Doc S/2014/189 (Mar. 15, 2014)
161. Id. at 1.
162. Id. at ¶ 3.
163. See U.N. SCOR 69th Sess., 7138th mtg. at 3, U.N. Doc S/PV.7138 (Mar.
15, 2014)
164. U.N. Charter art. 33 (the first article of Chapter VI, “Pacific Settlement of
Disputes”) states:
1.The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to
endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first
of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation,
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marked contrast to the mandatory nature of Chapter VII
resolutions.165 In vetoing this Chapter VI resolution, the Russian
permanent representative took the floor to declare that the Russian
Federation would “vote against the draft resolution.”166 None of the
Council member who spoke following the vote challenged Russia’s
right to veto the draft resolution. They should have: the UN Charter
makes clear that Russia should not have been allowed to vote at all.
Article 27 of the Charter states in relevant part:
Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters
shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members
including the concurring votes of the permanent
members; provided that, in decisions under Chapter
VI, and under paragraph 3 of Article 52, a party to a
dispute shall abstain from voting.167
The travaux preparatoires of Clause 2 of this article (in italics)
makes clear that a Council member that is a party to a dispute must
abstain from voting on a Chapter VI resolution. The genesis of the
principle was the proposal of the United Kingdom, made at the
Dumbarton Oaks Conference of 1944 that resulted in the ultimate
establishment of the United Nations the following year. The British
advanced the view that, where a Security Council member is a party
to a dispute, that member must abstain from voting on any resolution
before the Security Council respecting that dispute.168 The Soviet
position, in opposition, was that Council unanimity must be strictly
maintained, rejecting any requirement of abstention.169 The U.S.
arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or
arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.
2.The Security Council shall, when it deems necessary, call upon the
parties to settle their dispute by such means.
165. U.N. Charter art. 39, in contrast, empowers the Council to mandate a
resolution to disputes that, in its judgment, constitute a threat to international peace
and security.
166. U.N. SCOR 69th Sess., 7138th mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc S/PV.7138 (Mar. 15,
2014)
167. U.N. Charter art. 27, para. 3 (emphasis added). Article 52(3) involves the
use of regional organizations in the pacific settlement of disputes.
168. See Andreas Zimmerman, Article 27, in THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED
NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 880 (Bruno Simma, et al., eds. 2012).
169. Id.
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position set the compromise: where the Council is considering an
enforcement action, i.e., a Chapter VII resolution, every Council
member would vote; however, parties to a dispute must abstain where
the Council contemplates the pacific resolution of the dispute, “ie
under what is now Chapter VI.”170 This agreement was incorporated
into the Yalta formula and the San Francisco Declaration.171
The resultant language ultimately incorporated into the Charter,
quoted above, applies to substantive decisions under Chapter VI.172
That is to say, the “obligation to abstain applies, first and foremost, to
all measures expressly provided for in Arts 33, 34, 36, and 38.”173
The obligation to abstain from voting on a decisions arising under
Article 52(3) is “[p]arallel to measures under Chapter VI.”174 That is
because “mutatis mutandis, the very same considerations apply to
measures taken exclusively under Chapter VI (rather than under
Chapter VI in conjunction with Art. 52(3)).”175
There are thus two independent circumstances in which Clause 2
of Article 27(3) of the UN Charter requires a Security Council
member that is also a party to a dispute to abstain from voting. The
first circumstance is where the Council tables a resolution exclusively
under any of the substantive provisions of Chapter VI. The second
circumstance is where a resolution under Article 52(3) is tabled. In
order to require abstention, therefore, a resolution need only be made
exclusively pursuant to Chapter VI, not both Chapter VI and Article
52(3). This much is obvious both from the plain text of the provision,
as well as from the travaux. Both circumstances involve the Security
Council seeking to resolve the dispute through pacific means, outside
its enforcement powers.
Obviously the other permanent members, three of whom (the
U.S., the U.K., and France) tabled the resolution on Crimea, are as
able as are legal scholars to read the text of Article 27(3) and to
170. Id.
171. Id. at 880–881. Zimmerman notes that the Yalta formula used the term
“should” in lieu of “shall” that was used in the Charter itself. Id. at 880.
172. Id. at 919.
173. Id. at 920 (emphasis added). Zimmerman observes that, legalities aside,
this principle has no de facto relevance to Article 38, which requires the consent of
all parties to a dispute to apply. Id.
174. Id. at 922.
175. Id.
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access its travaux preparatoires, in whose creation each of them
participated. All delegations that addressed the issue inferentially
regarded Russia as a party to the dispute, and one named it so
explicitly.176 Yet none of them objected to the Russian veto. None
of them suggested—at least publicly—that the Russian Federation,
which had sent forces into Crimea and was about to annex the
territory, had no right to vote on this draft resolution brought under
Chapter VI of the Charter. Indeed, the US permanent representative
expressly conceded that Russia had the right to veto the draft
resolution.177 Why?
A definitive answer to this question will not be available until
governments disclose their archives reflecting the deliberations in
each capital at the time. With respect to the three permanent
members that voted for the resolution, however, it is easier to form
impressions of their motivations. The simple historical fact is that the
U.S., the U.K., and France have been far more likely to use military
force—with or without Security Council authorization—than either
China or the Russian Federation have since the end of the Cold War
(the U.S. and the U.K. even more so than France). Each of these three
powers, for instance, participated in the war in Kosovo, and two of
them occupied Iraq. Neither of these operations enjoyed the sanction
of the Security Council. It does not require great imagination to
conclude none of these powers wished to set a precedent over
Russia’s then-impending annexation of Crimea that might someday
be used against them, requiring them to abstain from vetoing a
resolution aimed at them. The legal arguments set forth above might
have been available, but Realpolitk considerations would dictate a
different course.
It should be noted parenthetically that state praxis on the
Security Council could conceivably overcome the text of the Charter
on this point, though a study of whether this situation has occurred
would be far beyond the scope of this article. The effective
176. The Lithuanian permanent representative accused the Russian Federation
of violating “the core tenets of the Charter,” including Article 2(4) requiring states
to refrain from the use or threat of the use of force in their international relations,
and Article 33(1), requiring the “parties to a dispute” to resolve such disputes
peaceably. U.N. SCOR, 69th Sess., 7138th mtg. at 6, U.N. Doc S/PV.7138 (Mar.
15, 2014)
177. Id. at 3.
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abnegation of the language of the Charter through praxis has
obtained, for instance, with respect to abstentions or absences from
voting by the five permanent members of the Security Council. The
plain text of clause 1 of Article 27(3) states unequivocally that nonprocedural decisions require the actual consensus of each of the five
permanent members for a resolution to pass, since it requires, “the
concurring votes of the permanent members.”178 Still, since 1946, “it
has been the consistent practice of the Security Council to interpret a
voluntary abstention by a permanent member as not tantamount to a
veto.” 179 If states serving on the Council have routinely voted on
Chapter VI resolutions concerning disputes to which they are parties,
such a practice would trump the wording of the Charter. Perhaps the
most famous negative vote cast by a non-permanent party to a dispute
was Rwanda’s vote—the sole negative vote—on the resolution
establishing the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.180 That
resolution, however, was a Chapter VII resolution,181 thus not subject
to the abstention requirement of Clause 2 of Art. 27(3).
CONCLUSION
On the eve of the First World War, the world’s powers—many
of them reluctantly—gathered at the invitation of the Tsar at the 1899
peace conference in The Hague.182 The German statesman, Friedrich
von Holstein, instructed his delegation, “For the state there is no aim
superior to the protection of its interests . . . In the case of great
powers these will not necessarily be identical with the maintenance of
peace.”183 How far has the international order progressed from that
rather grim assessment? The above digest of the interventions in
178. U.N. Charter art. 27, para. 3 (emphasis added). See also Anne Peters,
Humanity as the A and Ω of Sovereignty, 20 EUR. J. INT’L L. 513, 540 (2009)
(noting that Article 27(3) of the Charter on its face requires unanimity of the
permanent members).
179. Constantin A. Stavropoulos, The Practice of Voluntary Abstentions by
Permanent Members of the Security Council under Article 27, Paragraph 3, of the
Charter of the United Nations, 61 AM. J. INT’L L. 737, 742 (1967). See also The
Editors, Introduction, in THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL AND WAR 19
(Vaughn Lowe et al. eds., 2008) (noting at least five other areas in which U.N.
practice has gone beyond the Charter’s express language).
180. See U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg., at 3, U.N. Doc S/PV.3453 (Nov.
8, 1994) (wherein China abstained.)
181. S.C. Res 955, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994).
182. MARGARET MACMILLAN, THE WAR THAT ENDED PEACE: THE ROAD TO
1914 300 (2013).
183. Quoted in id. at 301.
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Libya and Syria suggest not nearly as far as advocates of
humanitarian interventions wish.
True, the international community intervened to remove
Muammar Gadhafi, a brutal tyrant who had terrorized his population
over forty-two years and was threatening to renew his barbaric
mistreatment of his own citizens in light of the revolution against his
rule. Yet the brutality of his reign had hardly caused him to be a
pariah in the international order, once he discharged his obligation in
respect to the Lockerbie and Ténéré bombings. Quite the contrary,
Libya could only be regarded as a respected member of the
international community by early 2011, weeks before the start of the
revolution. What changed in terms of the Western calculus to
intervene was not the actual reality of mass atrocities, but the
prospect of such atrocities. While that may appear to be a salutary
precedent for proponents of humanitarian intervention, given
subsequent events in Libya, the opposite may well be the case.
It was relatively easy, after all, for the international community
to intervene from the air to help the revolutionaries bring down the
Gadhafi regime. In the words of the by-now trite cliché, there were
no international “boots on the ground”, only an aerial bombardment.
Once the regime fell, however, there have been no calls for military
intervention to save the Libyans from an ongoing humanitarian
exigency, one in which the state itself is collapsing, with militias
roaming the streets of the major cities and towns. It must
presumptively be gauged by the beholder whether utter chaos
constitutes a higher or lower humanitarian ontological status as
compared with living under tyranny. Regardless, there have been no
international advocates for precipitating the rule of law in Libya
through the use of international peacekeepers. It remains, of course,
that Muammar Gadhafi had a personal history with most of the
world’s major powers (at least four of the permanent five members of
the Council) that made it politically feasible to remove him from
power.
In the event, the failure of the world to intervene in Syria appears
to be a blow to humanitarian intervention as a doctrine of
international law. In contrast to Libya, where the humanitarian crisis
was impending, in Syria the regime was in the act of barbarously
crushing its opponents. Yet the world powers only looked on,
unwilling to relieve an ongoing humanitarian catastrophe, apparently
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because the Security Council was deadlocked. A more cynical
reading of the events would suggest, as noted above, that war-weary
populations in the United States and the United Kingdom simply
could not countenance another intervention—even where chemical
weapons were used by the regime.
In the case of Syria, the Russian Federation has been protecting
an old and faithful ally. It, together with China, has also been
checking the Western powers on the Council. While this is
Realpolitik of the first order, it does not speak in favor of the viability
of the doctrine of humanitarian intervention. It is, perhaps, telling
that an observation made by one scholar nearly a decade ago may still
be valid today. While a right of humanitarian intervention may not
yet exist, given state praxis of interventions over the past several
decades and coupled with a growing opinio iuris in that direction, it is
possible that the world is in the midst of such a right “crystalliz[ing]
into a doctrine of customary international law.”184
The world may have progressed rather from the admonition with
which von Holstein left his delegates. It is unlikely that a senior
official of a major power would today phrase his terms of reference
so crudely. Yet the examples of the recent interventions discussed in
this article suggest that not enough has changed in terms of the
modern practice of states. While law may be the expected language
of international relations at the United Nations, political realities are
still, as a rule, a more important determinant for state action than law.
At the conference that gave rise to this paper, the moderator,
Prof. Maxwell O. Chibundu of the Carey School of Law, University
of Maryland, asked whether, in the absence of law, politics can play a
role to moderate the use of force by states. It was an outstanding
question, one not easily answered. At one level, one could say that
domestic politics certainly moderated against the use of force in Syria
with respect to the United States and the United Kingdom. That
answer, however, is glib and too subject to the vagaries of a particular
historic moment after each country had been at war for twelve years.
It is also true that the politics of the international order act as a
preventive to the use of force: For obvious reasons, there has been no
suggestion of a military intervention to defend Ukraine against a
naked use of force by Russia.
184. SUSAN BREAU, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION:
AND COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY 254, 271–274 (2005).
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Yet it is also difficult to see that law has been an efficient
counterbalance to the use of force, either. Law may matter in the
marginal case or in some countries, but the law is flexible and unsure
enough to allow countries to justify all but their most obviously
nakedly aggressive acts. To those who believed the Iraq war to be
illegal, action by the US and the UK and their allies was a case of
naked aggression. Yet both governments produced legal justifications
for the use of force, just as Harold Koh can adduce doctrinal
arguments supporting the use of force in Syria, even in the absence of
Council authorization. That the legal order is so weak and flexible is
hardly desirable. It would be far better for a stable and enforceable
international legal order to exist, one that closely regulates the use of
force, and one by which the world’s powers agree to be bound. Such
an international order, however, is not yet extant.

